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Abstract
This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has
taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts
to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the
possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting
permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to
wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively forgiving is genuinely possible—as this essay hopes to illustrate—then
this fact has implications for our understanding of both relational normativity and the nature of forgiveness.
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12 This essay defends the possibility of preemptively forgiving. That is, I 
13 defend the claim that one can forgive an action before the action has 
14 taken place. Forgiving need not be retrospective. I suspect that some— 
15 perhaps many— readers will initially balk at this idea. But I hope to reveal 
16 it to be a coherent moral possibility. 
17 Of course, it is hardly controversial that, in some circumstances, 
18 people can prospectively alter the normative status of another person’s 
19 action, relieving that person of being blamed for the action. Granting 
20 permission or consent can, in the right circumstances, make another 
21 person’s action permissible where it otherwise would have been imper- 
22 missible. So there is nothing foreign about a person releasing another 
23 prospectively. 
24 My claim, however, is that, before an action is performed, it may be 
25 possible to forgive the action in question without thereby granting per- 
26 mission or consent. In other words, I will argue that, in at least some 
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1 in some sense, releases that person from one’s censure without, at the 
2 same time, releasing her from the duty that she owes. 
3 The phenomenon of preemptive forgiving is worth thinking about 
4 for at least two reasons. First, there are rich philosophical questions about 
5 the nature of forgiveness. But the philosophical discussion has almost 
6 entirely assumed that forgiving occurs exclusively in response to past 
7 actions of others. If preemptive forgiving is a real phenomenon, attend- 
8 ing to it may alter how we think about forgiveness. There is also a second 
9 reason for thinking about preemptive forgiving, unrelated to the litera- 
10 ture on forgiveness. The possibility of preemptively forgiving illuminates 
11 a gap between directed duties and accountability. Preemptive forgiving 
12 suggests that one can waive one’s complaint— one’s standing  to hold 
13 another accountable— without necessarily waiving the relevant duties 
14 that one is owed. In other words, preemptive forgiving sheds light on 
15 the nature of certain normative concepts, which matters for everything 
16 from broad philosophical accounts of interpersonal morality to concrete 
17 doctrinal questions in the law. 
18 The essay proceeds in three parts. Part 1 examines what I take to be 
19 the two basic arguments against the possibility of preemptively forgiving. 
20 One argument focuses on the connection between forgiving and grant- 
21 ing permission, the other on the connection between forgiving and 
22 emotion. I begin with in-depth explication of these arguments because, 
23 if preemptive forgiving is possible, then much can be learned from turn- 
24 ing these arguments on theirheads. As they say, one person’s modus ponens 
25 is another person’s modus tollens. 
26 Part 2 consists of my argument that preemptive forgiving is poss- 
27 ible. I offer a series of examples and arguments to suggest that preemptive 
28 forgiving can occur without collapsing into a grant of permission. I hope 
29 to suggest that preemptive forgiving can serve important purposes. I then 
30 reject the reply that these apparent instances of preemptive forgiving are 
31 actually instances of promising to forgive in the future. 
32 Part 3 sketches, roughly, some of the implications that preemptive 
33 forgiving may hold both for philosophical understanding of forgiving 
34 and relational normativity as well as concrete practical issues like liability 
35 waivers. 
36 
37 1. Two Arguments against Preemptive Forgiving 
38 
Forgiving typically happens ex post. Philosophical accounts of forgive- 
39 
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1 giving can occur only after the act that is forgiven. The following state- 
2 ment from Horsburgh (1974, 269) is representative: “ There can be no 
3 question of forgiveness unless an injury has been inflicted on somebody 
4 by a moral agent. There must be something to forgive.” But this expla- 
5 nation is insufficient unless it is coupled with some reason for thinking 
6 that future actions cannot be part of our metaphysics. Certainly there 
7 must be something to forgive, but why can’t the something be something 
8 that hasn’t happened yet? 
9 Ultimately, I mean to argue that we can forgive an action that is yet 
10 to be performed. The main argument for this claim, however, does not 
11 come until the next section of the essay. I forgive (now) the impatient 
12 reader if she wishes (in the future) to skip ahead to that portion of the 
13 essay. Before turning to examples of preemptive forgiving, however, I 
14 want to discuss the arguments for the view that forgiving is necessarily 
15 retrospective. 
16 
17 1.1. Forgiving and Permission 
18 
There is an argument— what I will call the First Argument against Preemptive 
19 
Forgiving — that, if pressed, I believe many philosophers would be 
20 
inclined to endorse. David Londey (1986, 4) offers a particularly nice 
21 
articulation of the basic idea: 
22 
23 Forgiving someone for something is quite a complex act, as can be seen 
24 from the fact that the utterance “I forgive you for doing A” only has its full 
25 intended illocutionary force if a number of conditions are satisfied. In the 
26 first place, it must be the case that you have already done A—I cannot 
27 forgive you for what you have not done (although I can either predict that 
I shall forgive you if you do A, or give you permission to do it, thus remov- 
28 
ing any question of having to forgive you for it in the future). 
29 
30 The thought here is that forgiving must occur ex post. Anything before- 
31 hand would be something other than forgiveness— perhaps permission 
32 or prediction. 
33 The argument purports to stem from the nature of our moral 
34 concepts. The claim is not merely that, as a contingent and empirical 
35 matter, acts of forgiving come after the wrongful acts that they reference. 
36 Rather, it is the conceptual claim that an act cannot be an act of forgiving 
37 if it precedes the wrongful act that it references. 
38 Why think that forgiving is necessarily retrospective? The 
39 thought— exemplified by Londey— is that forgiving would cease to be 
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1 because that conceptual space is already occupied by other forms of 
2 interpersonal address. In particular, I will focus on the claim that pro- 
3 spective forgiving would collapse into granting permission. The thought 
4 is that forgiving operates as a form of release, but releasing someone 
5 beforehand would constitute granting permission, not forgiveness. Pre- 
6 emptive forgiving is supplanted by granting permission.1 
7 The connection between granting permission and forgiving is 
8 natural. Both, it seems, can be performatives.2 Both involve changing 
9 one’s relationship with another by virtue of some expression. When I 
10 say,  “I  grant  you  my  permission  to  f,”  under  the  proper  conditions, 
11 that utterance changes what is permissible for you to do. That is, saying 
12 it makes the world different; it is not merely reportive. Similarly, when I 
13 say, “I forgive you for fing,” under the proper conditions, that utterance 
14 makes things different between us. It alters our moral relationship. 
15 Not only are forgiving and granting permission both performa- 
16 tives; they both appear to effect somewhat similar alterations in the moral 
17 landscape. Both, for example, can sometimes be accomplished by saying, 
18 “It’s  okay.”  Granting  permission  and  granting  forgiveness  share  an 
19 element of moral release. Permission can be viewed as release from the 
20 perspective of either the recipient or the speaker. From the recipient’s 
21 perspective, permission operates to release one from a duty. Of course, 
22 for permission to release one from a duty, the duty in question must be 
23 owed to another in a manner that correlates with a Hohfeldian claim-right. 
24 So, from the speaker’s perspective, permission operates to waive one’s 
25 right or claim. For example, if I grant you permission to draw water from 
26 my well, then I have waived my right to exclude you from the well and you 
27 have been released from your duty not to take water from the well. 
28 Forgiving can also be viewed as a release. Again, this can be seen 
29 from the perspective of either the recipient or the speaker. From the re- 
30 cipient’s perspective, forgiveness operates as a release from a moral debt. 
31 One is released from being any longer held to account morally for a 
32 
33 
1. For an applied example of this argument, consider the following discussion of 
34 
presidential pardons: “A pardon can only forgive past actions. A president cannot use the 
35 
pardon power to preapprove an offense, because that is suspension of the law and not a 
36 
pardon. This is just inherent in the word ‘pardon’, and it limits the president even though 
37 
the Pardon Clause says nothing more explicit about it” (Kalt 2012, 44). 
38 
2. Austin (1962) never lists “I forgive” as a performative, though he does counte- 
nance similar utterances like “I accept your apology ” and “I pardon.” The claim that 
39 
forgiving can be a performative has been defended by Pettigrove (2012), Norlock 
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1 wrong. Symmetrically, from the speaker’s perspective, forgiving involves 
2 giving up some form of holding the other person accountable. Famously, 
3 forgiving can be characterized as, in some fashion, relinquishing one’s 
4 resentment.3 As Pamela Hieronymi (2001) has pointed out, resentment 
5 here should not be understood as simply a bare negative emotion from 
6 which we try to rid ourselves. Rather, resentment is a judgment-sensitive 
7 response to a wrong; it is a complaint or a protest against one’s treat- 
8 ment.4 To forgive, then, is to give up or forsake this protest. For example, 
9 if you have injured me by cutting down my apple tree but I forgive you, 
10 then I have given up resenting you and you are released from bearing 
11 such censure. 
12 So forgiving, like permission, dissolves some moral connective 
13 tissue.5 But, even granting this similarity, why think that forgiving 
14 would collapse into permission if it occurred beforehand? Why suppose 
15 that preemptive forgiving would offer the same thing as permission? 
16 The answer, I think, reflects a common assumption about the 
17 relationship among our ethical concepts. From what has been said thus 
18 far, forgiving and permission involve different moral releases: granting 
19 permission waives a claim-right and releases someone from a duty, where- 
20 as forgiving waives a complaint and releases someone from a moral debt. 
21 It is natural, however, to view these concepts as deeply connected. Accord- 
22 ing to this view— which a number of moral philosophers have recently 
23 defended— rights and directed duties are bound up with complaints and 
24 reactive attitudes. To have a right or a claim ex ante is to be one who would 
25 
26 
27 3. Something roughly like this idea is found in Bishop Butler’s (1726) Fifteen Ser- 
28 mons. The rich scholarly literature interpreting Butler can be read as largely a debate over 
29 what, precisely, must be given up in forgiveness. On a standard reading of Butler, forgiving 
involves giving up one’s resentment and revenge. But this may be too strong. Garcia 
30 (2011) argues that Butler believes only that forgiveness involves giving up revenge and 
31 malice, not resentment. Westlund (2009) suggests that Butler requires only moderating 
32 one’s resentment,  such that  it mirrors  the indignation  of a  neutral observer.  Regardless, 
33 the point of consensus is that forgiving involves giving up some form of holding another 
accountable. Strawson (1962, 6) accepted some version of this idea, writing, “To ask to be 
34 forgiven is in part to acknowledge that the attitude displayed in our actions was such as 
35 might properly be resented and in part to repudiate that attitude for the future (or at least, 
36 for the immediate future); and to forgive is to accept the repudiation and to forswear the 
37 resentment.” 
38 4. One challenge for Hieronymi’s account is to explain who it is that has the stand- 
ing to resent and thus to forgive. See Zaragoza 2012. I believe that any adequate account of 
39 forgiving should face precisely this challenge. 
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1 have a complaint ex post.6 To owe a duty to someone is to be liable to 
2 wronging that person if one fails.7 In short, rights, duties, complaints, and 
3 resentment are all elements of the same ultimate moral connection 
4 between two persons. 
5 If that’s correct, then forgiving and permission do start to look like 
6 conceptual siblings. Permission waives a claim and forgiving waives a 
7 complaint, but each ultimately dissolves the same underlying connection 
8 between agents. The only difference seems to be the temporal context.8 
9 This idea— that permitting constitutes the prospective analogue of 
10 forgiving— is sometimes explicit. For example, Piers Benn (1996, 380) 
11 argues that one can forgive only on one’s own behalf, “much as I can 
12 offer someone my own services, but not the services of another without 
13 first gaining their permission.” Or, to take a less high-brow example, this 
14 parallel seems to be presupposed by the slogan, “it is easier to ask 
15 for forgiveness than permission.”9 Either way, the idea is that permission 
16 and forgiveness are different manifestations of what is ultimately the 
17 same normative shift. A similar assumption is often found in legal argu- 
18 ment too. For example, in patent cases, courts regularly assert that a non- 
19 exclusive license (that is, granting permission) is equivalent to releasing 
20 liability (that is, waiving a complaint).10 
21 These reflections might give the impression that, far from being 
22 impossible, preemptive forgiving is possible and familiar— we just call it 
23 “granting permission.” The final step in the argument involves showing 
24 that granting permission cannot count as a form of forgiving. The reason 
25 is that forgiving does not make an action permissible. To forgive an action 
26 is not to say that what was done was not wrong or not blameworthy.11 
27 
28 
29 6. See, for example, Darwall 2009, 4: “If [someone stepping on your foot] accepts that 
you can demand that he move his foot, he must also accept that you will have grounds 
30 for complaint or some other  form of accountability-seeking response if he doesn’t.” 
31 7. See, for example, Thompson 2004. 
32 8. This thought might be bolstered by pointing out that, analogously, granting 
33 permission after the fact is impossible because all that one can do is forgive. See Quynh 
Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 147 N.M. 583, 599 (N.M. 2010): “Allstate essentially argues for a 
34 retroactive grant of permission. This approach is contrary to the plain meaning of ‘per- 
35 mitted’ and ignores the important distinctions between obtaining permission and seek- 
36 ing forgiveness.” 
37 9. Widely attributed to Rear Admirable Grace Hopper. 
38 10. See TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1276 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), stating that “a non-exclusive patent license is equivalent to a covenant not 
39 to sue” and collecting citations for this proposition. 
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1 Unlike condoning, which implies that whatever putative wrong has been 
2 committed was not objectionable, or excusing, which implies that the 
3 actor was not blameworthy for the wrongful act committed, forgiving 
4 must retain the view that the action in question was impermissible and 
5 blameworthy. “It’s okay,” in the context of forgiving, does not mean, “It 
6 was okay.” As Seana Shiffrin (2007, 729) puts it: “In response to another’s 
7 wrong, we have the elective power to forgive, but forgiveness involves, 
8 among other things, recognition of a past wrong, not a power to make it 
9 the case that a wrong was never a wrong.” So, granting permission cannot 
10 be forgiving’s preemptive form. 
11 This is the First Argument in a nutshell: If it were possible, pre- 
12 emptive forgiving would essentially amount to granting permission, but 
13 then it would no longer be a form of forgiving at all. For precision, here is 
14 a more formal articulation: 
15 (1) If preemptive forgiving were possible, then it would involve X for- 
16 giving Y for fing in the future. 
17 (2) A person forgives another iff he or she gives up his orher standing to 
18 complain against the person. 
19 (3) Thus, if preemptive forgiving were possible, then it would involve X 
20 giving up the standing to complain against Y for fing in the future. 
21 [From 1 and 2] 
22 (4) X has a claim/right against Y not to f only if X would have the 
23 standing to complain against Y if Y fs. 
24 (5) Thus, if preemptive forgiving were possible, then it would involve X 
25 giving up the claim/right that Y not f. [From 3 and 4] 
26 (6) A person grants permission to another to f iff he or she gives up his 
or her claim/right that that person not f. 
27 (7) Thus, if preemptive forgiving were possible, it would involve X 
28 granting permission to Y to f. [From 5 and 6] 
29 (8) Granting permission makes an instance of fing permissible. 
30 (9) Forgiving someone for fing does not make an instance of fing 
31 permissible. 
32 (10) Therefore, preemptive forgiving is not possible. [From 7, 8, and 9] 
33 
34 
35    
36 The basic puzzle is that if an actor is culpable for wrongdoing, then forgiving may appear 
37 unduly condoning; but if an actor is not (or is no longer) culpable, then forgiving may 
38 appear inapt. As Kolnai (1974, 97 – 98) puts it, “[Either] forgiveness is objectionable and 
ungenuine inasmuch as there is no reason to forgive ... [or] at the other end of its spec- 
39 trum, forgiveness seem to collapse into mere redundancy, or the mere registering of 
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1 The argument turns on important assumptions about the nature of for- 
2 giving (2, 9) and the connection between moral concepts (4). If, as I shall 
3 argue, this argument is incorrect, then that may shed new light on these 
4 assumptions. 
5 
6 1.2. Forgiving and Emotion 
7 
Before  turning  to  the  argument  for  preemptive  forgiving,  there  is 
8 
another argument worth discussing. It starts from a different perspective 
9 
on forgiveness. The First Argument relies on the idea that forgiving, like 
10 
granting permission, can be a performative. But not everyone accepts 
11 
that idea. If forgiving is an explicit performative, then the act of forgiving 
12 
consists in saying “I forgive you.” Rather, the objection goes, true forgiv- 
13 
ing consists in a change of heart.12 As Jeffrie Murphy puts it, “Forgiveness 
14 
is primarily a matter of changing how one feels with respect to a person 
15 
who has done one injury ” (Murphy and Hampton 1988, 167). Forgiving, 
16 
then, is not a speech act at all but rather an attitudinal shift. Govier and 
17 
Verwoerd (2002, 97) offer a nice articulation of this position: 
18 
19 “I forgive you” is not a performative in the way that “I promise you” is. If a 
20 woman says “I forgive you” to her husband, who has confessed an affair, 
21 but then continues to remind him of it, appeal to his unfaithfulness to 
22 score points in their domestic battles, and nag him about his comings and 
23 goings, all this goes to show that regardless of what she said, she has not 
forgiven him. The emotional and attitudinal shifts involved in forgiveness 
24 
occur over time and, in a case of serious wrongdoing, will typically involve 
25 
considerable reflection and struggle. 
26 
27 There is a shift in attitudes that this woman has not yet adopted. And we 
28 might naturally describe this by saying that she has not “truly” forgiven 
29 her husband. One might conclude, as Govier and Verwoerd have, that 
30 forgiving cannot be accomplished by utterance. 
31 The idea that forgiving requires an attitudinal shift is the basis for 
32 the Second Argument against Preemptive Forgiving. It runs as follows: Forgiv- 
33 ing requires relinquishing negative reactive attitudes; one acquires 
34 negative reactive attitudes only after an action is performed; therefore, 
35 forgiving can occur only after an action is performed. In other words, 
36 
37 
38 12. See Downie 1965, 131: “It is not satisfactory to say that the mere uttering of the words ‘I forgive you’ constitutes forgiveness. The uttering of these words or their equiv- 
39 alent,  is  certainly  not  sufficient  to  constitute  forgiveness.  Unless  the  words are 
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1 preemptive forgiving is impossible because one has not yet experienced 
2 the wrongdoing and acquired the resentment that forgiving relinquishes. 
3 Recall Horsburgh’s remark that there “must be something to forgive.” 
4 The Second Argument gives this thought content by explaining that 
5 if nothing has happened yet, then there is no emotional response to 
6 overcome. 
7 There are two important premises supporting this Second Argu- 
8 ment. First, the Second Argument assumes that forgiving exclusively or 
9 principally involves attitudinal changes. This is a strong claim. Acknowl- 
10 edging that forgiving often refers to an attitudinal shift does not mean 
11 that there is not also a performative element to forgiving. Some elements 
12 or forms of forgiving may still occur without the paradigmatic attitudinal 
13 shift. For example, in Govier and Verwoerd’s example, the wife’s utter- 
14 ance “I  forgive you”  does effect an important  change.13 After the wife 
15 utters this, her continued complaints become inappropriate in a way that 
16 they were not otherwise.14 By speaking as she did, the wife surrendered 
17 some standing to hold her husband accountable.15 Her utterance altered 
18 the discursive norms going forward; it changed what it was appropriate 
19 for her to do and say.16 One way to understand this is as something like 
20 a promise not to hold the other party to account—“a promise not to 
21 use the past against the future” (Digeser 2001, 71).17 In this way, the 
22 expression of forgiveness can function to change what one may and 
23 may not do, much like a promise does. Forgiving thus seems to have an 
24 outward dimension, irrespective of attitudes, that shapes how we relate 
25 to one another. 
26 Even granting that forgiving can have a performative aspect, one 
27 might still insist that this is only derivative, the attitudinal shift ultimately 
28 
29 
13. Owens (2012, 52) rejects the claim that forgiving is a performative, but he recog- 
30 
nizes that “forgiveness changes the normative situation by ensuring that guilt and blame 
31 
for that wrong are no longer apt.” 
32 
14. This can be obscured by the way that the example is described. Perhaps “nagging” 
33 
and attempting to “score points” are always wrong. But not all complaints or expressions 
of resentment are inappropriate if one has yet to forgive. 
34 
15. Dzur and Wertheimer (2002, 12) explain: “It may be thought that to say ‘I forgive 
35 
you’ without experiencing the relevant emotions is empty. But that is false. The request for 
36 
and granting of forgiveness has behavioral consequences. If V says ‘I forgive you’, V cannot 
37 
continue to express a desire to see O suffer, or to demand additional apologies.” 
38 
16. One might describe forgiving in terms of what Helmreich (2015) has described as 
“stance-taking.” 
39 
17. As Norlock (2009, 101) notes, “a negotiation rather than a unilateral promise” 
40 
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1 being fundamental. For example, immediately after acknowledging that 
2 forgiving has two aspects, Margaret Holmgren (2012, 44 – 45) writes: 
3 Viewing forgiveness as a performative puts the cart before the horse. We 
4 must first determine whether an attitude of forgiveness is an appropriate 
5 response to wrongdoing. . . .  If we believe that an attitude of forgiveness is 
6 morally appropriate in a given situation, but we have not yet managed to 
7 overcome our resentment, we will have to decide whether it is better to be 
8 honest with the offender or to offer him the peace of mind that he might 
9 gain from hearing us say “I forgive you.” 
10 Holmgren makes it sound like, whatever the illocutionary force of for- 
11 giving might be, the attitude of forgiving is conceptually prior. To utter 
12 “I forgive you” without the attitudinal shift is not “honest.” 
13 This assumption that the attitudinal shift, and not the utterance, 
14 constitutes “true” forgiving— an essential premise of the Second Argu- 
15 ment— strikes me as severe. It precludes the more neutral position that 
16 “either can be considered manifestations of forgiveness and, depending 
17 on the circumstances, exercising one of these is not inferior to exercising 
18 both” (Norlock 2009, 97). In a range of circumstances, forgiving apart 
19 from an attitudinal shift serves important purposes. Sometimes, the 
20 speech act will precede changing our attitudes and serve as a first step 
21 along the way. We may want our child to say “I forgive you,” then later 
22 remind him that he forgave the person that he is now treating resentfully. 
23 On other occasions, the speech act may have important effects in terms of 
24 welcoming a person back into a group or community. For example, it may 
25 be important to declare that one forgives one’s coworker so that others in 
26 the office can move on, even if one has not gotten over it oneself. It seems 
27 unnatural to claim that instances like these are not real cases of forgiving, 
28 or are somehow infelicitous forgiving. 
29 The Second Argument also turns on another rather strong prem- 
30 ise; namely, that reactive attitudes arise only after a wrong act is per- 
31 formed. Of course, resentment paradigmatically arises after someone 
32 has  committed  a wrong.  But  it may also  be that one sees in advance 
33 that a wrong is going to be committed and begins to acquire the negative 
34 attitudes beforehand. For a vivid example, consider the following passage 
35 from Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel The Buried Giant, explaining the bloodlust 
36 of soon-to-be genocide victims: 
37 
38 I speak of people at the end of a brutal road. . . .  [N]ow comes an invading 
39 army of overwhelming size. The fort may hold several days, perhaps even a 
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1 They know the infants they circle in their arms will before long be blood- 
2 ied toys kicked about like cobbles. . .  . They know this is to come, and so 
3 must cherish the earlier days of the siege, when the enemy first pay the 
4 price for what they will later do. In other words . . .  it’s vengeance to be 
5 relished in advance by those not able to take it in its proper place. (Ishiguro 
6 2015, 139 – 40; emphasis added) 
7 The point can be seen in more mundane examples as well. Consider the 
8 emotion felt when you see that a driver, whom you have watched weaving 
9 in and out of traffic, is about to cut you off. It seems odd to insist that our 
10 emotional reactions never arrive first. Such anticipatory resentment 
11 makes sense, in part, because we resent the fact that the person would 
12 commit the wrong, which is revealed to us in our anticipation. If a spouse 
13 believes that a partner is going to cheat, resentment is intelligible partly 
14 as a response to that merely being a realistic possibility. 
15 As I will argue below, I believe that preemptive forgiving is possible 
16 and that the Second Argument is false. But this is not to deny its force. 
17 One virtue of the Second Argument is that it explains why preemptive 
18 forgiving is not paradigmatic forgiving. Even if it is possible, preemptive 
19 forgiving will always be, in a way, an imperfect form of forgiving because of 
20 how it is situated relative to our emotional responses. Paradigmatic for- 
21 giving will involve both performative elements and shifts in attitudes— 
22 attitudes that paradigmatically arise ex post. Preemptive forgiving will 
23 not look like this, and that is philosophically significant. 
24 
25 2. Preemptively Giving Up One’s Complaint 
26 
Having described the arguments for thinking that preemptive forgiving 
27 





 Some Initial Examples 
31 
32 Superficially, at least, it looks like we can engage in forgiving one another 
33 preemptively. Our linguistic practices don’t seem to preclude it. We can 
34 say things like “I forgive you if you do such-and-such.” For example, in 
35 Stendahl’s The Red and the Black, Madame Reˆnal, fearing that her lover is 
36 ending their affair, dramatically writes to him: “I  shall never survive  our 
37 final separation by a single day. . .  . Go! I forgive you if you love me no 
38 more. . .  . It is a small thing in my eyes to pay for the happy days that I have 
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1 Madame Reˆnal appears, at least, to be forgiving her lover for the depar- 
2 ture that he has not yet made. Somewhat differently, in a legal context, a 
3 contract might state, “I hereby waive my complaints should such-and-such 
4 happen.” Ostensibly, locutions like these forsake some entitlement to 
5 hold another accountable before the action in question occurs. 
6 But ordinary language is hardly decisive, and one might insist that 
7 utterances like these aren’t truly examples of forgiving or waiving a com- 
8 plaint. In fact, locutions like these might appear to be ways of granting 
9 permission, lending credence to the First Argument. “ You won’t hear 
10 me complain” can be a colloquial way to say, “ You have my permission.” 
11 Reading significance into the difference would be pointless parsing of 
12 words. I mean to resist this view. 
13 The case for preemptive forgiving requires not mere linguistic 
14 evidence but evidence from the functioning of our ethical practices. 
15 Consider an example. Two soldiers are on patrol, when an explosive 
16 device wounds one of them. Although the camp is only a few miles 
17 away, the wounded soldier is unable to get up the steep hillside, even 
18 with the other soldier’s help. They are able to call for assistance, but they 
19 are informed that it will be several hours before aid can be dispatched to 
20 their location. The unharmed soldier promises that he will stay by the 
21 wounded soldier’s side until help comes. But after an hour of sitting in the 
22 cold rain, the unharmed soldier is visibly shivering and the gunfire is 
23 approaching. The wounded soldier says, “I forgive you if you leave me.” 
24 The soldier leaves. 
25 One might say that the soldier has acted wrongly by leaving. He has 
26 broken his promise and abandoned his comrade. Insofar as he has acted 
27 wrongly, it is because he has violated the obligations that he owed to his 
28 fellow soldier. But how can we make sense of this evaluation in light of the 
29 wounded soldier’s statement? There cannot be a violation of the soldier’s 
30 obligations if those obligations were waived. One possible response is to 
31 say that the wounded soldier didn’t really mean what he said. Although it 
32 looked like waiving or forgiving, the statement was merely a ritualistic 
33 expression of appreciation or sympathy. This is not implausible and 
34 might, in some situations, be the correct interpretation. But it has the 
35 disadvantage of refusing to take the wounded soldier’s statement at face 
36 value. Although he said that he wouldn’t hold it against his comrade, 
37 it turns out that he can hold it against him. 
38 I want to suggest that there is another possibility: the wounded 
39 soldier has waived his future complaints and yet has not released the 
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1 comrade of his obligation, but he has disclaimed holding him to blame 
2 for its violation in the future.18 This possibility takes the wounded sol- 
3 dier’s statement at face value— he forgives the other soldier. But it does 
4 not treat that as equivalent to waiving the duty that was owed to him. If one 
5 assumes the strong conceptual tie between obligations and complaints, 
6 then there are only two possibilities— either the statement had no real 
7 moral significance or it was a waiver of the obligations owed to the wound- 
8 ed soldier. My suggestion is that there is an intermediate option: waiving 
9 the complaint but not the obligation. 
10 Lest one get too caught up in one example, consider a second 
11 from one of the most oft-told stories in the Western tradition. 
12 Jesus was troubled in spirit and testified, “ Very truly I tell you, one of you is 
13 going to betray me.” His disciples stared at one another, at a loss to know 
14 which of them he meant. One of them, the disciple whom Jesus loved, was 
15 reclining next to him. Simon Peter motioned to this disciple and said, 
16 “Ask him which one he means.” Leaning back against Jesus, he asked him, 
17 “Lord, who is it?” Jesus answered, “It is the one to whom I will give this 
18 piece of bread when I have dipped it in the dish.” Then, dipping the piece 
19 of bread, he gave it to Judas, the son of Simon Iscariot. As soon as Judas 
20 took the bread, Satan entered into him. So Jesus told him, “ What you are 
21 about to do, do quickly.” But no one at the meal understood why Jesus said 
22 this to him. (John 13:21 – 29) 
23 Although its meaning is the subject of some controversy, Jesus’s conduct 
24 toward Judas is often read to express something like the statement, “I 
25 forgive you for what you are about to do.”19 But Judas’s action was still 
26 wrong and a sin. Interpreting Jesus as forgiving Judas’s betrayal in 
27 
28 
29 18. Preemptive forgiving is, in some sense, necessarily conditional. It takes the form, “I 
forgive you if you f.” This raises questions about how to understand what has happened 
30 if you do not f. There appear to be two possibilities. First, we might say that no forgiving 
31 occurred, interpreting it as “[I forgive you] if [you f ].” Alternatively, we might say that I 
32 forgave something nonactual, interpreting it as “I forgive [you if you f ].” (If forgiving 
33 something nonactual sounds mysterious, consider forgiving a transgression that one 
mistakenly believes to have been committed.) I will remain neutral between these 
34 views. What is essential to my argument is that if the wrong is committed, it has already 
35 been forgiven. 
36 19. The passage in John seems to portray Jesus’s treatment as forgiving, if not encour- 
37 aging, Judas’s betrayal. This interpretation is reinforced by the famous plea: “Father, 
38 forgive them, for they know not what they do” (Luke 23:34). Matthew paints a somewhat 
darker picture: “ Woe be to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! It would have 
39 been better  for that man if he had not been born” (Matthew 26:23 – 24). The  contrast 
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1 advance is not taken to imply that he granted permission or that it was any 
2 less a betrayal. 
3 Whether or not forgiveness is the correct biblical interpretation is 
4 unimportant. Insofar as this interpretation is intelligible, it illustrates a 
5 certain moral possibility. It’s conceptually coherent to think that Jesus 
6 forgave without granting permission. The story thus provides an example 
7 of preemptively waiving one’s prerogative to hold another accountable 
8 without, at the same time, waiving one’s entitlement to be treated justly. 
9 One way to see that the waiver of complaint in these examples does 
10 not operate as a waiver of the duty is to consider the evaluation of some 
11 other member of the moral community. While the wounded soldier in 
12 the first example and Jesus in the second example may both have given up 
13 any complaint about the wrongfulness of the act done to them, this would 
14 not stop the rest of us from blaming the wrongdoers.20 Not only could we 
15 say that the acts are blameworthy, but, more importantly, we could say that 
16 the acts were a violation of duties owed to the other person. Although the 
17 wounded soldier may be barred from saying it, the rest of us can say that, 
18 in leaving him, the unharmed soldier violates the duty he owed to his 
19 wounded companion. And, regardless of whether Jesus preemptively for- 
20 gave him, the rest of us can say that Judas betrayed Jesus— violated his 
21 duties to him. If this is correct, then waiving the complaint does not mean 
22 the elimination of the directed duty. The right— understood as the Hoh- 
23 feldian correlate of that directed duty— survives the waiver of the poten- 
24 tial complaint. 
25 One thing that the two examples above have in common is that 
26 both involve situations in which it would be hard to imagine the mere 
27 words making the action permissible. In the promise-to-stay example, it’s 
28 possible that nothing the wounded soldier might say could truly release 
29 the other soldier. The soldier knew the situation when he made the 
30 promise, the promise is reinforced by background norms of soldiering, 
31 and the wounded soldier is now vulnerable. Similarly, in the Judas story, 
32 it seems hard to imagine that anyone can grant permission for— truly 
33 make permissible— a betrayal 
34 
35    
36 Judas’s betrayal was forgiven (as we get in John) even though it was very wrong (as we get in 
37 Matthew). 
38 20. Owens (2012) argues that forgiving makes it the case that even third parties 
should relinquish reactive attitudes. This strikes me as implausible, at least as a general 
39 matter. Although forgiving may sometimes affect how others should treat a wrongdoer, 
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1 It is probably not coincidence that preemptive forgiving appears 
2 in examples like these. The sense that the rights in these examples are 
3 largely unwaivable operates to cancel the conversational implicature 
4 between waiving one’s complaint and waiving one’s right. While normally 
5 preemptively waiving a complaint might be understood to imply per- 
6 mission, that implication is blocked in these cases. 
7 Still, I don’t believe that unwaivable duties are necessary for pre- 
8 emptive forgiving. The implication can be blocked in other ways— for 
9 example, by explicit statement. Suppose a woman promises her down-on- 
10 her-luck friend that she will take her on a camping trip. As the weekend 
11 approaches, however, the woman receives an invitation to a professional 
12 event that might be a prime career opportunity for her. She explains the 
13 situation to her friend, essentially requesting to be released from her 
14 promise to go camping that weekend. Imagine the friend responds by 
15 saying something like this: “If you want me to let you off the hook, the 
16 answer is no. You promised me, and you owe me this. But I can’t make you 
17 go. If you decide to bail on me, I understand and I forgive you. I know this 
18 is a tempting opportunity for you, and we’ve all been there. So I won’t 
19 complain or hold it against you.” I believe that there is nothing contra- 
20 dictory or incoherent in this. The friend refused to release the promise, 
21 but she nonetheless forgives the prospective breaking of that promise— 
22 that is, forsakes the future  complaint she would  otherwise  have. Both 
23 these things must be explicitly stated because, otherwise, the one might 
24 imply the negation of the other. But this implication can be blocked by 
25 explicit disavowal. 
26 
27 2.2. Preemptive Forgiving’s Functions 
28 
Even if these examples suggest that preemptive forgiving might, theo- 
29 
retically, be possible, one might wonder what purpose it could serve. 
30 
Resistance to the phenomenon might be partly based on the sense that 
31 
it can have little function and is therefore at best anomalous. In this 
32 
section, I want to explore the possible motivations for preemptively for- 
33 
giving. I hope to suggest that there are actually a wide variety of contexts 
34 
in which preemptively forgiving may play a valuable function. I describe 
35 
nine such contexts, but I don’t take this survey to be exhaustive. 
36 
First, preemptive forgiving may arise where granting permission is 
37 
impossible. As already noted, one way that this can happen is if the right 
38 
in question cannot be waived. Consider the following passage from Her- 
39 
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1 It is only each person himself that can have his choices respected. It is no 
2 more possible to transfer this right than it is to transfer one’s right to 
3 life. . . .  If without our permission, without our choosing it, someone 
4 used us as a shield, we may, I should suppose, forgive the person for 
5 treating us as an object. But we do not thereby waive our right to be treated 
6 as a person, for that is a right that has been infringed and what we have at 
most done is put ourselves in a position where it is inappropriate any 
7 longer to exercise the right to complain. 
8 
9 Morris’s  claim  here is  that there  is an inalienable  right  to  have one’s 
10 choices respected.21 The inalienability is demonstrated by the fact that 
11 the most one can do is forgive, or, as he puts it, put ourselves in a position 
12 where we can no longer complain. Another way that granting permission 
13 may be impossible is when permission is not one’s to give. In some cases, a 
14 party who is not the victim of a wrong will nevertheless have standing to 
15 forgive. The parent, for example, might resent the wrong done to his or 
16 her child.22 In such cases, a party will not be in position to grant per- 
17 mission and preemptive forgiving will be all that is available. For example, 
18 imagine that a divorced parent recognizes that the other parent is on the 
19 verge of ducking out of their children’s lives. That parent could not give 
20 permission insofar as the duty is owed to the children. But the parent 
21 might, I think, say something like, “I forgive you if you abandon them” 
22 (assuming that abandonment is not simply unforgivable). Here, again, 
23 the possibility of preemptive forgiving makes sense because granting per- 
24 mission does not seem possible. 
25 Second, preemptive forgiving may make sense when one antici- 
26 pates that forgiving ex post will not be available. The vivid case arises when 
27 one anticipates death. When, for example, the wrong countenanced is 
28 one’s own killing, then preemptive forgiving is the only option.23 But one 
29 
30 
21. For the distinction between alienation and waiver, see Feinberg 1978. What is 
31 
important to me is that a right be, in some particular context, unwaivable. Morris is 
32 
focused on inalienability, which entails unwaivability in all circumstances. 
33 
22. The standard response is that parents are victims in their own right when their 
children are harmed. See Horsbrugh 1974, 276; Murphy and Hampton 1988, 56n16; 
34 
Haber 1991, 49. Pettigrove (2009) offers a compelling rejection of this contention. I be- 
35 
lieve third-party forgiving arises because a party may have a personal complaint without 
36 
being the bearer of the right in question. 
37 
23. Forgiving one’s own killing seems to be a good place to see the phenomenon of 
38 
preemptive forgiving. In 2004, the last words of a prisoner executed by the state of Virginia 
were, “I forgive you for what you’re doing.” In the Hollywood film Faster (2010), Dwayne 
39 
Johnson (a.k.a. The Rock) is about to execute an evangelist who wronged him when the 
40 
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1 might anticipate being unable to forgive afterward for less dramatic 
2 reasons. One might know that one will be beyond communication, or 
3 one may worry that one will forget the transgression so completely that 
4 one would forget to forgive. Particularly interesting cases, I think, arise 
5 when one anticipates being unwilling to forgive ex post. Suppose that you 
6 see your beloved child poised to do you a severe wrong. Knowing yourself 
7 prone to holding grudges excessively, you fear that, once the wrong is 
8 committed, you will beunabletobring yourself toforgive. But atpresent— 
9 before the sting of the injury has been felt— you want to express your 
10 present stance toward the wrongdoing as, though wrong, not destroying 
11 your relationship. Like the person who anticipates death, you want now 
12 to forgive out of a fear that you will be unable to do so later. 
13 Third, preemptive forgiving may be a useful mechanism for avoid- 
14 ing conflict.24 One may have a coworker or neighbor who one sees is set 
15 on committing a wrong. The resulting tension might be undesirable— 
16 because it is awkward or because it would require a waste of energy. Fore- 
17 swearing resentment in advance may be a means to diffuse the tension 
18 before it arises. This function may be particularly important where there 
19 are conflicting understandings of the relevant norms. I forgive you if you 
20 parody my god, not because I think it permissible but because I recognize 
21 that you believe quite differently than I do. 
22 A related fourth possibility is that preemptive forgiving may serve 
23 as a token of goodwill. A poetic example can be found in one telling of the 
24 Scottish story The Lovers of Gudrun. One man says to the old friend with 
25 whom he is now in conflict, “Let us never forget . . . the joyous days of old 
26 and the love that knit us together. Let us forgive whatever ill the one may 
27 have done to the other— yea, let us forgive beforehand whatsoever of 
28 wrong may yet fall out between us— so that our love may be remembered 
29 of men and not the strife into which we are surely drifting” (Edgar 1907, 
30 178). Here, preemptive forgiving is viewed as a way to express goodwill 
31 for the purpose of mending a friendship. But the gesture might be equal- 
32 ly used to build, not just rebuild, a relationship. 
33 Fifth, preemptive forgiving may function compassionately to 
34 relieve the burdens on a wrongdoer in anticipation of a wrong. We may, 
35 in certain circumstances, want to relieve the transgressor from some of 
36 
37 
38 24. Dillon (2001, 72), in a rare discussion of forward-looking forgiveness, describes as “preservative self-forgiveness” a disposition not to form negative evaluations and 
39 emotions that would need to be overcome. Dillon’s concern is with a disposition or 
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1 the burdens— like guilt or punishment— that he or she will feel in facing 
2 a difficult choice. For example, imagine that you have been helping a 
3 friend battle addiction. You see that she is in danger of using again, but 
4 that she is deeply pained by the guilt of letting you down. The guilt 
5 associated with her backsliding may be, one can imagine, as destructive 
6 as the substance abuse itself. Wishing to mitigate the damage, you may 
7 want to express the fact that you forgive her for what she is going to do, 
8 even though you do not condone it. Something similar, I think, motivated 
9 the  Obama  administration’s  decision  in  2015  to  announce  that  they 
10 would no longer prosecute families that negotiate with kidnappers. 
11 This announcement did not make negotiating permissible— the legal 
12 prohibition was retained— but it did acknowledge that the government 
13 would no longer hold people accountable for violations. Preemptive for- 
14 giving, in these cases, serves as compassionate relief to avoid compound- 
15 ing the harm of an inevitable transgression. 
16 Relatedly, a sixth purpose for preemptive forgiving arises when 
17 someone is excessively concerned with avoiding committing a wrong. 
18 Although people are more often inadequately attentive to their duties, 
19 occasionally people are overly concerned about avoiding wrongs. When 
20 this is true, preemptive forgiving may help someone to apply the appro- 
21 priate level of care. For example, imagine that an experienced actor and a 
22 novice are rehearsing a love scene involving various forms of physical 
23 contact. The novice is extremely tentative, afraid of clumsily touching 
24 the other actor inappropriately. Seeing that this fear is undermining the 
25 scene, the experienced actor might tell the struggling novice that the 
26 actor forgives any inappropriate touching that might inadvertently 
27 occur.25 This is not permission to grope; it does not make inappropriate 
28 touching appropriate. But it may help to alleviate the excessive caution 
29 that is undermining the scene. Only by relieving future blame can they 
30 engage in the shared activity successfully. If this seems like a peculiar 
31 example, it is worth noting that many liability waivers serve something 
32 of this function as well. A service provider may be able to offer me the 
33 service that I desire in the fashion that I desire it only if I am willing to 
34 waive liability— otherwise the service will be burdened by so many safe- 




25. This example is loosely based on my experience as an unconvincing Ferdinand in 
39 
a high school production of The Tempest. If it adds texture to the example, imagine one 
40 
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1 Of course, liability waivers are not always a mechanism for en- 
2 abling joint activity unhindered by fear of liability. Sometimes they are 
3 a negotiated concession, and this suggests a seventh purpose that pre- 
4 emptive forgiving may serve. I may agree to forgive you for the bad thing 
5 that you are contemplating only in exchange for something from you 
6 or from someone else. Negotiated forgiveness is familiar in political 
7 contexts, but something similar happens even in interpersonal cases. 
8 One can agree to forgive because one is getting something in return. 
9 And preemptive forgiving can serve this purpose. 
10 Eighth, preemptive forgiving may be a way to avoid hypocrisy. In 
11 the camping trip example, the self-deprecating statement, “we’ve all been 
12 there,” helps makes sense of the friend’s preemptive forgiving. It helps 
13 the listener understand how the speaker can, on the one hand, insist on 
14 the existence of the duty and yet, on the other hand, forgive its transgres- 
15 sion before it has even occurred— or, put another way, how she can retain 
16 her claim even while forsaking any future complaint. Perhaps some self- 
17 deprecation — a recognition of one’s own sins or a recognition of one’s 
18 own luck in not sinning— is at the root of all acts of forgiving.26 Even if it is 
19 not, preemptively waiving one’s complaint may be an acknowledgment 
20 that one would not have standing to complain against some particular 
21 wrong. 
22 Finally, preemptive forgiving may serve an important function 
23 where a conflict exists between pro-tanto obligations. By preemptively for- 
24 giving, I may acknowledge that another person has an all-things-consid- 
25 ered duty to do something that the person has a pro-tanto obligation to me 
26 not to do. For example, suppose that you have mistakenly made two 
27 conflicting promises about what you will do on Saturday. Recognizing 
28 that your promise to take your mother to the doctor is more important 
29 than your promise to meet my parents and me for lunch, I might tell you 
30 that I forgive you if you have to cancel. Forgiving here functions as an 
31 acknowledgment that you now face other competing obligations. But 
32 preemptively forgiving, here, need not amount to a release. You still 
33 have an obligation to my parents and me to try, if possible, to meet  us. 
34 Preemptive forgiving serves as a way to acknowledge that one recognizes 




26. For psychological evidence that it might be, see Exline et al. 2008. For a rich 
39 
philosophical account along these lines, see Garrard and McNaughton 2003. This may be 
40 
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1 Preemptive forgiving serves a wide array of purposes. As many of 
2 the above examples suggest, preemptive forgiving may offer only an 
3 imperfect response to nonideal circumstances. But this should not lead 
4 us to say that these are not truly instances of forgiving. Something mean- 
5 ingful occurs. Preemptive forgiving— even  where the forgiving is not 
6 paradigmatic and comprehensive— serves important functions in our 
7 interpersonal lives, nonideal as they often are. 
8 
9 2.3. Preemptive Forgiving versus Promising to Forgive 
10 
There is an important reply to consider at this point. In the face of the 
11 
examples above, a skeptic might attempt to recharacterize them as prom- 
12 
ises to forgive in the future. That is, one might insist that presently waiving 
13 
one’s future complaint or resentment is impossible, seeing instead only 
14 
promises not to complain or resent. This response avoids detaching 
15 
rights from the standing to complain. The person doesn’t lose his or 
16 
her standing to complain. When the violation occurs, the person still, 
17 
in some sense, has the complaint, but she has promised not to avail herself 
18 
of it. One might bolster this response by noting that, in the law, people 
19 
frequently make promises to hold others harmless— that is, covenants 
20 
not to sue— and that such promises seem to be our way of waiving an 
21 
unformed future complaint.27 
22 
I wish to make three points about this response. First and most 
23 
importantly, this response strikes me as simply unable to explain our 
24 
moral experience adequately. The response implies that forgiving 
25 
requires that something be done in the future, even if that is just refrain- 
26 
ing from holding the other person accountable; what I have been calling 
27 
preemptive forgiving is merely a prologue to the actual forgiving. But this 
28 
interpretation seems implausible, I believe, when one imagines that the 
29 
future action is, or becomes, unavailable. Suppose that the wounded 
30 
soldier says, “I forgive you if you leave me,” and then loses consciousness. 
31 
Minutes later, as gunfire approaches, the unharmed soldier leaves. 
32 
Through binoculars from a safe distance away, the soldier sees his wound- 
33 
ed comrade struck by an explosion and killed, having never regained 
34 
consciousness. According to my view, the wounded soldier already for- 
35 
gave the act of leaving. But the promise-to-forgive response would say that 
36 
he only promised to forgive it, and now he is dead. We can imagine this 
37 
difference mattering if the surviving soldier is plagued by the question of 
38 
39 
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1 whether his friend forgave him.28 I see no reason to say that the forgive- 
2 ness was inadequate or incomplete.29 So, even if there are some cases 
3 that should be interpreted as promises to forgive, I do not believe that 
4 all can be. 
5 Second, this response is somewhat unstable. When one tries to 
6 spell out the idea of a promise to forgive, it seems to collapse into either 
7 preemptive forgiving or a promise that one cannot give. Consider first 
8 how it might collapse into preemptive forgiving. Recall that, according to 
9 certain views, performative forgiving is basically like promising. Forgiving 
10 can be understood, more or less, as a promise not to hold a past wrong 
11 against the wrongdoer. If that’s right, then a promise to forgive would be 
12 a promise to make a promise in the future. Now, that’s a weird structure. 
13 In certain instances— for example, land purchases and wedding engage- 
14 ments— we do promise, contingent  on certain  conditions,  to make a 
15 promise. But, if I say, without any conditions, “I promise you that tomor- 
16 row I will promise you that I will take you to the airport,” then it is tempt- 
17 ing to say that I have already effectively promised to take you to the 
18 airport. Similarly, unless it is conditional, the promise to forgive may 
19 start to look like present forgiving.30 
20 Now, one might respond by saying that the promise to forgive is 
21 conditional— it depends on the wrong being committed. But this gets 
22 tricky. Is the promise to forgive conditional or is the not holding account- 
23 able conditional?31 The reason for thinking that the promise must be 
24 
25 
28. One might object, here, that what one cares about is what the wounded soldier 
26 thought and felt, not whether he performed the act of forgiving per se. But I don’t think 
27 
that’s entirely accurate. Norlock discusses a case in which Simon Wiesenthal was asked by a 
28 Nazi soldier to forgive him. Norlock uses the example to show how we often care about the 
29 performative, not an internal emotional state: “The soldier who asked Simon Wiesenthal 
for forgiveness didn’t seem to be asking for a report of how Wiesenthal felt. It was critical 
30 
to him that someone express something like forgiveness to him for his war crimes before 
31 he died” (Norlock 2009, 105). 
32 29. Compare Helmreich 2015, 85, 102, on the meaningfulness of deathbed 
33 apologies. 
30. This is a bit quick. It seems plausible to say, “I promise to forgive you next week, 
34 but right now I cannot.” But it is important, in that case, that there is a temporal gap. It 
35 preserves some role for the complaint or resentment to play. Similarly, one might say, 
36 preemptively, “If you do that, I promise to forgive you within a week.” But it seems much 
37 more odd to say, “If you do that, I promise to forgive you that very instant.” 
38 31. To see the point better, consider the two-layer airport promise again. Compare 
the following: (1) “I promise you that tomorrow, if my wife agrees, I will promise you that I 
39 will take you to the airport the following day.” (2) “I promise you that tomorrow I will 
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1 conditional is, presumably, that the conditions for forgiving are not yet 
2 in place until after the wrong is committed. Forgiving, one might insist, 
3 requires an emotional transition, not merely a rational choice. One can- 
4 not give up holding another accountable until one experiences the 
5 resentment. But this point can lead to instability in the opposite direc- 
6 tion. If that is the worry, then why think that one can make a promise to 
7 experience the emotions in this way? Once forgiving is viewed as a matter 
8 of having and releasing certain emotions, it no longer looks like some- 
9 thing we are in a position to promise. Thus, interpreting all apparent 
10 instances of preemptive forgiving as promises to forgive starts to feel 
11 precarious. 
12 Third and finally, even if the above problems could be overcome, 
13 the response operates largely by linguistic stipulation. It loses the con- 
14 nection between having a complaint and having the standing to com- 
15 plain. What I have been describing are cases in which one seems to have a 
16 right and yet one seems to have given up the entitlement— the position 
17 or standing— to complain upon the right’s violation. On my view, having 
18 a complaint is understood in terms of being able, morally speaking, to do 
19 something—namely, to hold the other person accountable. The promise- 
20 to-forgive response simply posits another, different sense of ‘having a 
21 complaint’ that has nothing to do with being able to do anything. ‘Having 
22 a complaint’ in this sense means simply that one had a right violated. It is 
23 merely a placeholder to retain the desired conceptual connection. 
24 The artificiality of the response is plain when one considers its full 
25 implications. Is every waiver of a complaint like this? Is it impossible to 
26 forsake one’s moral complaint, and possible only to promise not to use it? 
27 Note that the same points might apply to waiving a right. Why not say that 
28 one never waives a right but only promises not to exercise it? These ques- 
29 tions, I believe, highlight the fact that at least one important sense of 
30 having a right and having a complaint involves being able, normatively 




condition on making the second promise and the two-layer structure makes some sense. 
35 
In (2), the condition is on the action being promised, and the two-layer structure is 
36 
essentially pointless. That is, (2) collapses into a promise to take the person to the airport 
37 
if it is raining. Now the present question is in what sense is preemptive forgiving con- 
38 
ditional: (1a) “I promise that if you do the wrong, I will promise not to hold it against you” 
or (2a) “I promise that I will promise that I will not hold it against you if you do the wrong”? 
39 
If the former, then the two-layer structure has a role to play, but, if the latter, it does not and 
40 
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1 have, in at least one sense, given up the right or complaint. One can, of 
2 course, insist on not using the terms in this way but doing so will not 
3 change the moral phenomena. 
4 
5 3. The Significance of Preemptive Forgiving 
6 
I think that preemptive forgiving is intrinsically interesting. But I also 
7 
think that its possibility holds further significance. If the arguments 
8 
against preemptive forgiving are  wrong,  then one  or another of  their 
9 
central assumptions must be mistaken. These arguments must have mis- 
10 
characterized the nature of forgiving or the nature of our normative 
11 
concepts or both. In this final section, I want to sketch, roughly, some 
12 
of these possible implications, both at the conceptual level and at the very 
13 
practical. My remarks here are meant less as conclusive argument than 
14 





3.1. Performative and Attitudinal Forgiving 
18 
19 The Second Argument, described in part 1, relied on two important 
20 premises: that forgiving necessarily requires an emotional shift and that 
21 the necessary reactive attitudes cannot be present until after wrongdoing 
22 takes place. If the argument were correct, then preemptive forgiving 
23 would not be possible. 
24 But it is possible. This means that the Second Argument might be 
25 run in reverse, so to speak. Insofar as preemptive forgiving is possible, 
26 either forgiving need not involve an emotional shift or reactive attitudes 
27 can be present before an action occurs. I suspect that both are true, but 
28 I will focus here on whether forgiving requires an emotional shift. 
29 Examples of preemptive forgiving are generally examples of for- 
30 giving  operating  as  a  performative.  Preemptive  forgiving  typically 
31 involves a declaration or communication that one surrenders holding 
32 another accountable. A first implication of preemptive forgiving,  then, 
33 is that it generates an argument against— or at least a challenge for— 
34 accounts of forgiving that characterize forgiving as essentially attitudinal. 
35 If forgiving necessarily involves a shift in attitudes, how can one make 
36 sense of the apparent phenomenon of people forgiving before the atti- 
37 tude-triggering event occurs?32 Even if this challenge can be answered, 
38 
39 32. One response, of course, would be to give up the Second Argument’s other 
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1 it may clarify or complicate the connection between forgiving and 
2 shifting one’s attitudes. 
3 One temptation, I think, in reacting to the debate between attitu- 
4 dinal and performative accounts of forgiving is to conclude that there are 
5 simply two different phenomena, both labeled as “forgiving.” In one 
6 sense, the wounded soldier forgave his comrade, and, in another sense, 
7 he never had the chance. There is performative forgiving and attitudinal 
8 forgiving, and that’s all there is to it. This solution, however, is rather 
9 unsatisfactory. There must be some deep connection. 
10 Based on what I have said about preemptive forgiving, I will briefly 
11 venture a hypothesis: All forgiving is giving up one’s complaint, but this 
12 can happen in two ways. A complaint involves both a standing and an 
13 invocation. One can give up one’s complaint— that is, forgive— by giving 
14 up either the standing or the invocation (or both). 
15 I have been characterizing performative forgiving as surrendering 
16 one’s standing. It is a declaration that alters the appropriateness of mak- 
17 ing a complaint. Attitudinal forgiving can also be viewed as giving up 
18 one’s complaint. Earlier, I mentioned Hieronymi’s (2001) thought that 
19 the attitude of resentment is a form of protest. If this is right, then giving 
20 up one’s resentment is giving up one’s protest— or, we might say, one’s 
21 complaint. The attitude shift in forgiving occurs when one relinquishes 
22 the attitude of complaint or protest.33 The two forms of forgiving, then, 
23 are unified as forms of giving up one’s complaint. This is just a hypothesis, 
24 but it is made palpable through preemptive forgiving’s illustration of 
25 surrendering standing in a nonreactive way. 
26 
27 3.2. Claims and the Standing to Complain 
28 
For me, perhaps the most intriguing possible implication of preemptive 
29 
forgiving is that it might offer a window into the connection— or the 
30 
disconnect— between certain ethical and juridical concepts. Just as the 
31 
Second Argument might be run in reverse, so too might the First Argu- 
32 
ment. As I described it in part 1, the First Argument relies on a premise 
33 
34 
35 believe that reactive attitudes can arise beforehand, this strikes me as implausible as a 
36 general explanation of preemptive forgiving. In the various examples of preemptive 
37 forgiving in part 2, I doubt that all the forgivers should be described as already feeling 
38 resentment. 
33. Calhoun (1992, 95) also describes forgiving as giving up one’s second-personal 
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1 about the relationship between having a right or a claim and having the 
2 standing to complain or resent. Preemptive forgiving appears to show the 
3 possibility of relinquishing one’s standing to complain without thereby 
4 releasing someone from his or her duty. If so, then having a claim or a 
5 right is not necessarily tied to having the standing to complain. 
6 At the risk of being pedantic, this reverse argument might be laid 
7 out as follows: 
8 (1 0) If preemptive forgiving were possible, then it would involve X for- 
9 giving Y for fing in the future. 
10 (2 0) Forgiving someone for fing does not make an instance of fing 
11 permissible. 
12 (3 0) Granting permission makes an instance of fing permissible. 
13 (4 0) Thus, if preemptive forgiving were possible, then it would involve X 
14 forgiving Y for fing in the future without thereby granting per- 
15 mission. [From 1 0 ,2 0, and 3 0] 
16 (5 0) A person forgives another iff he or she gives up his or her standing 
17 to complain against the person. 
18 (6 0) Thus, if preemptive forgiving were possible, then it would involve X 
giving up the standing to complain against Y for fing in the future 
19 without thereby granting permission. [From 1 0 and 5 0] 
20 (7 0)  A person grants permission to another to f iff he or she gives up his 
21 or her claim/right that that person not f. 
22 (8 0) Thus, if preemptive forgiving were possible, it would involve X 
23 giving up his or her standing to complain against Y for fing in 
24 the future without X giving up his or her claim/right that Y not f. 
25 [From 6 0 and 7 0] 
26 (9 0) Preemptive forgiving is possible. 
27 (10 0)  Therefore, it is possible for X to give up X’s standing to complain 
28 against Y for fing in the future without X giving up his or her 
29 claim/right that Y not f. [From 8 0 and 9 0] 
30 (11 0) Therefore, it is not the case that X has a claim/right against Y not 
to f only if X would have the standing to complain against Y if Y fs. 
31 
[From 10 0] 
32 
33 The premises— save for the claim that preemptive forgiving is possible— 
34 are copied directly from the First Argument. 
35 Why might one have thought that having a right requires having 
36 the standing to complain? Because philosophers sometimes suggest as 
37 much. In tackling the important task of articulating how obligations 
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1 appeal to the idea of the standing to complain or hold accountable.34 
2 Darwall, for example, says that the obligation “presupposes” an authority 
3 to hold accountable. We have claims insofar as we could lodge a special 
4 kind of complaint. Jay Wallace (2007, 90) writes, “It is characteristic of 
5 relational normativity, as I understand it, that the person who is wronged 
6 by you has a privileged basis for complaint against you, an objection to 
7 your conduct that is not shared by mere observers to what was done.” The 
8 basic idea is that we can understand relational obligations in terms of the 
9 standing to hold accountable. 
10 I fear that this explication can give the false impression that the 
11 sphere of relational normativity is more unified and homogenous than it 
12 is. We have both directed duties, claims that others have on our conduct 
13 ex ante, and accountability relations, complaints that others can make 
14 against us after we have transgressed. These things can, and often do, go 
15 together. But perhaps not necessarily. Preemptive forgiving, in which a 
16 party gives up her standing to complain while continuing to be owed the 
17 duty, seems to provide an example of these normative concepts coming 
18 apart. 
19 Of course, no one thinks that it is always appropriate to hold 
20 another accountable whenever one’s rights have been violated. A wrong- 
21 doer may have an excuse that would relieve accountability. Or some other 
22 consideration, like the potential for harm or the passage of time, may 
23 render it inappropriate for a victim to bring forth her complaint. Every- 
24 one would acknowledge that one’s complaint upon being wronged will be 
25 defeasible in these sorts of ways. 
26 But I think that preemptive forgiving may offer more of a chal- 
27 lenge. In cases of excuse, the victim still has the standing to complain— 
28 this is why the excuse is given to her — but the wrongdoer has an answer to 
29 that complaint. In cases where there is some reason not to complain, the 
30 victim again retains the standing to complain, but she ought not exercise 
31 that standing. In preemptive forgiving, however, having a right threatens 
32 to come apart, not merely from successful and appropriate complaint, 
33 but from the standing to complain.35 The sense in which a preemptive 
34 
35 34. See, for example, Gilbert 2004, 90: “If you fail to give me what I have a right to 
36 through your promise, I have the standing, as your promisee, to rebuke you on that 
37 account. Similarly, should you threaten to break your promise, I have the standing, as 
38 your promisee, to command or insist that you act as promised, and thus pressure you to 
perform.” 
39 35. There may be other contexts in which these concepts diverge as well. They seem 
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1 forgiver cannot  complain is not merely that any complaint would be 
2 defeated or wrong; complaint is made inapt. If this is correct, then pre- 
3 emptive forgiving offers a glimpse into a gap between two concepts of 
4 relational normativity— rightholding and the standing to hold account- 
5 able— that are typically thought to be tightly connected.36 
6 
7 3.3. Liability Waivers as Preemptive Forgiving 
8 
This point about rights and the standing to complain may sound abstract. 
9 
In this final section, I want to suggest how significant it can be even for 
10 
very practical matters. I will suggest that we cannot understand the run-of- 
11 
the-mill liability waiver without appreciating the distinction. This is 
12 
because liability waivers are, I believe, a form of preemptive forgiving. 
13 
Liability waivers look to be a context in which one can abandon 
14 
one’s complaint without thereby granting permission. When I go to a ski 
15 
resort and I sign a liability waiver releasing the resort from liability if I 
16 
break my leg, I am not thereby giving them permission to break my leg. 
17 
One natural way to interpret this is to say that I have given up any com- 
18 
plaint that I may have should they violate my rights. I have given up my 
19 
complaint without giving up my rights. That is, I preemptively forgive the 
20 
ski resort if they break my leg. 
21 
This is not, however, the way that liability waivers are typically con- 
22 
ceptualized in the law. Any attorney would say that liability waivers are 
23 
promises not to sue. Superficial appearances seem to confirm this. Lia- 
24 
bility waivers are often couched as “an agreement to hold harmless” and 
25 
“a covenant not to sue.” This is contract language. So it looks like liability 
26 
27 
28    
29 though the right belongs only to the victim. See Cornell 2015. This standing to complain, 
apart from any right or claim, is evident in such parties’ standing to forgive. See Pettigrove 
30 2009. Hypocrisy is arguably another case, like preemptive forgiving, in which one might 
31 lose standing to complain without losing one’s rights. See Cohen 2013. The complaints of 
32 wrongdoers can thus raise significant puzzles for accounts of relational normativity that 
33 are unwilling to distinguish having a right from having the standing to complain. See 
Smilansky 2006. While each of these phenomena raise their own sets of questions, they all 
34 pose similar challenges to any view that connects having a right and having the standing to 
35 complain too tightly. 
36 36. Acknowledging this difference, one might argue that preemptive forgiving oper- 
37 ates by introducing second-order, exclusionary reasons. Compare Raz 1990. On this view, 
38 the victim still has first-order reasons to complain—albeit excluded reasons—and thus 
rightholding still corresponds with a person having reasons to complain. Even if this is 
39 correct, it would not preserve the supposed connection between having a right and having 
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1 waivers are not present waivers of a legal complaint but rather contractual 
2 promises not to exercise whatever legal complaint might arise. 
3 Earlier, I argued that it is possible to preemptively forgive as 
4 opposed to promise to forgive in the future. I want to suggest that this 
5 is how we should generally understand liability waivers. Contrary to the 
6 widespread legal description, they are not promises of future conduct but 
7 present waivers of future unrealized complaints. 
8 To see the practical difference here, one must understand that the 
9 law’s typical response to breach of a contractual promise is to require the 
10 breaching party to pay damages. If you breach your contract to buy my 
11 goods, then I can sue you and make you pay me for the profits I’ve lost. 
12 But liability waivers don’t typically work like that. If I sue the ski resort for 
13 breaking my leg, my lawsuit will get dismissed. The ski resort doesn’t sue 
14 me to recover their losses as a result of my lawsuit. So, if the liability waiver 
15 is actually a contractual promise not to bring suit, then why does it operate 
16 to bar a lawsuit? Why doesn’t enforcement of a liability waiver take the 
17 form of an action for expectation damages? 
18 A first answer might be that the covenant not to sue operates as a 
19 bar to a suit because, if it did not, pointless circularity would result. The 
20 defendant could turn around and sue the plaintiff for whatever damages 
21 were recovered, so it is simply more efficient to bar the action to begin 
22 with. Here is how one legal treatise explains the issue: “A covenant not to 
23 sue . . .  is a bar to the original cause of action. This is to avoid circuity of 
24 action; for if the plaintiff in the original action were to recover, the 
25 defendant could recover precisely the same damages back for breach of 
26 the covenant to forbear or not to sue” (Williston and Lord 1990, 677 – 78). 
27 This circularity makes it pointless to have a separate action for damages 
28 instead of simply barring the original action. 
29 But it may not always be pointless. Suppose, for example, the 
30 plaintiff values the expressive function of obtaining a judgment,37 even 
31 if he or she will have to forfeit any damages right back to the defendant. 
32 I may want the court to declare that the ski resort wronged me, even if I 
33 have to break my promise not to sue them and I will have to turn over any 
34 damages that I receive. A more practical difference will arise where the 
35 damages for breach might exceed the damages obtained in the under- 
36 lying case. For example, if I sue the ski resort, the resort may wish to 
37 counterclaim for breach of contract and recover additional damages, 
38 
39 
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1 such as attorney fees. Can it do this? A minority of jurisdictions do con- 
2 clude that a party in breach of a covenant not to sue can be held liable for 
3 attorney fees.38 The explanation for this position appeals to the idea that 
4 a covenant not to sue is a promise and subject to the normal remedies for 
5 breach.39 
6 But there is a second option. The covenant not to sue can be 
7 viewed not as an additional promise but rather as a present waiver. 
8 Here is how an early opinion from the Supreme Court of Michigan 
9 puts it: “An agreement never to sue . .  . operates as a release. Not as it 
10 has so often been said, upon the principle of avoiding circuity of action, 
11 but because in substance and effect it is a release. . .  . [W]e think it is clear 
12 that an agreement not to sue . . .  is never a distinct and independent 
13 undertaking, upon which an action is maintainable, but a mere modifi- 
14 cation or extinguishment . . . and as such may be availed of in defense.”40 
15 What the court is keen to express, here, is that the covenant not to sue 
16 should not be conceived as its own separate promise but rather as a 
17 release. To allow a separate action for damages would be, as another 
18 early court put it, “marking out a crooked path for litigants to travel, 
19 and one that was in nowise contemplated by their contract.”41 
20 The leading case on this issue is a Second Circuit opinion by Judge 
21 Friendly. The crucial passage declares: 
22 Certainly it is not beyond the powers of a lawyer to draw a covenant not to 
23 sue in such terms as to make clear that any breach will entail liability for 
24 damages, including the most certain of all— defendant’s litigation 
25 expense. Yet to distill all this out of the usual formal covenant would be 
26 going too far; its primary function is to serve as a shield rather than as a 
27 sword. . . .  In the absence of contrary evidence, sufficient effect is given the 
28 usual covenant not to sue if, in addition to its service as a defense, it is read 
29 
30 
31 38. See, for example, Divine Tower Int’l Corp. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., 
32 L.P.A., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85246, 9 – 10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2008): “In  Ohio,  where 
33 there is a breach of a covenant not to sue, an available remedy is actual damages, which are 
measured by the attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the lawsuit.” 
34 39. See, for example, Colton v. New York Hospital, 53 A.D.2d 588, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 
35 1976): “A covenant not to sue is . . .  merely an agreement not to enforce an existing cause 
36 of action. . .  . Thus, the party possessing the right of action is not precluded thereby from 
37 thereafter bringing suit; however, he may be compelled to respond in damages for breach 
38 of the covenant.” 
40. Morgan v. Butterfield, 3 Mich. 615, 624 – 25 (1855), affirming Robinson v. God- 
39 frey, 2 Mich. 408 (1852). 
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1 as imposing liability only for suits brought in obvious breach or otherwise 
2 in bad faith.42 
3 Judge Friendly’s point is that while one could make a full-blown contract 
4 not to sue, the ordinary liability waiver should be read as something that 
5 merely releases the other party— something that can be used as a shield 
6 but not as a sword. A majority of American jurisdictions— though not 
7 all— follow this approach.43 
8 I think that Judge Friendly gets this precisely right. What is impor- 
9 tant is what the parties are intending to do. And, at least ordinarily, when 
10 one agrees not to sue, what one intends to do is give up whatever future 
11 complaint one might have. It is not meant as undertaking a contractual 
12 obligation but rather as a surrender of one’s standing to complain. It is 
13 waiving one’s complaint, not promising not to complain. In a legal sense, 
14 it is preemptive forgiving. The jurisdictions that take the opposite view 
15 have, I think, been handcuffed by not recognizing this as a coherent 
16 conceptual possibility. 
17 This legal discussion offers just one illustration of the importance 
18 of preemptive forgiving as a normative phenomenon. If we do not 
19 appreciate the gap that exists between having a right and having a 
20 complaint— the gap that preemptive forgiving opens up— then we can- 
21 not understand something as commonplace as a liability waiver. Preemp- 
22 tive forgiving may thus provide a window into the complexity of the 
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